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In previous work, we introduced Echo, a new 
approach to the formal verification of the functional 
correctness of software. Part of what makes Echo prac-
tical is a technique called verification refactoring. The 
program to be verified is mechanically refactored spe-
cifically to facilitate verification. After refactoring, the 
program is documented with low-level annotations, 
and a specification is extracted mechanically. Proofs 
that the semantics of the refactored program are equiv-
alent to those of the original program, that the code 
conforms to the annotations, and that the extracted 
specification implies the program’s original specifica-
tion constitute the verification argument. In this paper, 
we discuss verification refactoring and illustrate it with 
a case study of the verification of an optimized imple-
mentation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
against its official specification. We compare the prac-
ticality of verification using refactoring with tradi-
tional correctness proofs and refinement, and we 
assess its efficacy using seeded defects.
1. Introduction
Developing software that is sufficiently depend-
able for critical applications is a difficult challenge. A 
desirable technology for helping to meet that challenge 
is formal verification. Unfortunately, although formal 
verification has proven effective, it is not widely used. 
In part, this is because of pragmatic difficulties.
In previous work, we introduced the Echo 
approach to formal verification [14, 17]. The goal that 
we have for Echo is to make formal verification of 
software more practical. We seek an approach that 
works seamlessly with existing software development 
techniques, that can be applied routinely and with rea-
sonable effort, and that requires only average skill.
By formal verification we mean the establishment 
of a proof based on logical inference (as opposed to 
model checking) that a given program is a correct 
implementation of a given specification. Different 
aspects of a specification are sometimes dealt with sep-
arately in formal verification. For example, verification 
of functionality is often separated from verification of 
timing in real-time software. Our focus in this paper is 
on verification of functionality.
A factor that frequently limits formal verification 
of functionality is the complexity of the subject soft-
ware. Efforts to build software that is compact, effi-
cient, and highly functional tend to produce software 
systems that, in principle, could be verified, but for 
which the human effort involved and the detail man-
agement required make formal verification either unat-
tractive or infeasible.
To deal with this problem, Echo includes a mecha-
nism that we refer to as verification refactoring. The 
concept is to refactor software that was developed by 
conventional means using semantics-preserving trans-
formations to produce a functionally equivalent ver-
sion for which formal verification is practical. The 
transformations that are applied are selected solely to 
facilitate the major verification proofs and each is 
proven to be semantics preserving.
In this paper, we discuss the concept and mecha-
nism of verification refactoring. As part of the refactor-
ing process, we introduce the use of software 
complexity metrics as a tool for guiding the refactoring 
process. We present preliminary assessment data from 
a case study of the verification of an optimized imple-
mentation of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 
against its official specification. We also present the 
results of an experiment in which we seeded defects 
into the implementation to determine the difficulty 
developers might face when locating defects that cause 
formal verification to fail.
2. Existing Approaches to Verification
Existing approaches to verification fall basically 
into three categories: correctness proofs, refinement, 
and model checking and static analysis. 
Correctness proof, for example the weakest pre-
condition approach, tries to establish the theorem that when a program’s precondition is satisfied, its postcon-
dition will be satisfied after execution. The main diffi-
culty that arises with it is complexity. Although 
machine assistance has been developed, the details can 
easily overwhelm whatever machine resources are 
available, even for relatively small programs. The issue 
is not just the cumulative detail for the program, but 
also the complexity of individual predicates associated 
with elaborate or intricate source statements.
Refinement based approaches such as the B 
Method [1] have been created in response to practical 
difficulties with correctness proofs. Software develop-
ment by refinement involves the transformation of an 
abstract specification to a concrete implementation by 
a series of refinement transformations. The output of 
each transformation is proved to imply the input.
Creating a proof along with the program to which 
it applies is a laudable goal. However, the goal restricts 
the exploration of alternatives during software devel-
opment and leads to the following limitations:
• Many existing software development techniques 
cannot be used because software development is 
constrained by the simultaneous proof development.
• If changes to an existing program are required to 
meet performance goals, the whole refinement path 
needs to be revisited so as to update the proof.
These limitations essentially make refinement 
approaches either impractical or undesirable for the 
vast majority of software developments.
To achieve necessary levels of assurance for cru-
cial applications, testing is usually not feasible, and so 
mechanical analysis, where possible, is an attractive 
alternative. In addition to correctness proof and refine-
ment, several other verification techniques have been 
developed, such as model checking and static analysis, 
to try to facilitate mechanical verification. Although 
such techniques scale quite well and have been applied 
successfully, their analysis targets only certain proper-
ties. For crucial applications, functional verification is 
highly desirable.
3. The Echo Verification Approach
We present a brief summary of the Echo approach. 
Further details are available elsewhere [14, 17].
At the heart of Echo verification is a process that 
we refer to as reverse synthesis in which a high-level, 
abstract specification (that we refer to as the extracted
specification) is synthesized from a low-level, detailed 
specification of a system. Verification then involves 
two proofs: (1) the implementation proof, a proof that 
the source code implements the low-level specification 
correctly; and (2) the implication proof, a proof that 
the extracted specification implies the original system 
specification from which the software was built. Each 
of these proofs is either generated automatically or 
mechanically checked, and each can be tackled with 
separate specialized techniques and notations.
The Echo approach imposes no restrictions on 
how software is built except that development has to 
start with a formal system specification, and develop-
ers have to create the low-level specification docu-
menting the source code. There are no limitations on 
design or implementation techniques nor on notations 
that can be used. The present instantiation of Echo 
uses: (1) PVS [12] to document the system specifica-
tion and the extracted specification; (2) the SPARK 
subset of Ada [3] for the source program; and (3) the 
SPARK Ada annotation language to document the low-
level specification. In the current instantiation, the 
proof that the extracted specification implies the sys-
tem specification is created using the PVS theorem 
prover, and the proof that the low-level specification is 
implemented by the source code is created by the 
SPARK Ada tools. The extracted specification is cre-
ated by custom tools.
4. Motivation for Verification Refactoring
Informally, by verification refactoring we mean 
the transformation of a program in such a way that the 
functional semantics of the program (but not necessar-
ily the temporal semantics) are preserved and verifica-
tion is facilitated. The reverse synthesis process in 
Echo makes extensive use of verification refactoring, 
and it is a critical part of the way in which Echo is 
made more broadly applicable. In this section, we dis-
cuss the motivation for verification refactoring in terms 
of the difficulties that it helps to circumvent in the two 
Echo proofs.
Significant effort in software development goes 
into making sure that the software is adequately effi-
cient. The result of this effort is careful treatment of 
special cases, compact data structures and efficient 
algorithms, with the inevitable introduction of com-
plexity into the control- and data-flow graphs. Much of 
the difficulty in formal verification results from the 
complexity of the source program. One of the reasons 
for the use of verification refactoring is to reduce this 
complexity.
A second reason for the use of verification refac-
toring is to align the structure of the extracted specifi-
cation with the structure of the system specification. 
This alignment permits the implication proof to be 
structured as a series of lemmas and allows an efficient overall proof structure.
The transformations used and the mechanism of 
their selection is different for the two proofs, and so we 
discuss each separately in this section.
4.1.Support For The Implication Proof
The implication proof is the proof that the 
extracted specification implies the original specifica-
tion from which the program was written. In principle, 
if the software is indeed a correct implementation of 
the specification, then it is always possible to construct 
such a proof. The challenge in Echo, however, is to 
make the construction of the proof relatively routine.
The feasibility of this proof rests in large measure 
on the form, content and structure of the extracted 
specification. Echo uses several techniques to synthe-
size this specification [17], but the key in Echo to mak-
ing the proof practical lies in a technique that we refer 
to as architectural and direct mapping. This technique 
rests on the hypothesis that the high-level architectural 
information in a specification is frequently retained in 
the implementation. We have no experimental evi-
dence to support this hypothesis, but our rationale for 
believing it is discussed in an earlier paper [17].
Architectural and direct mapping provides the 
basis of the implication proof. The structure of the 
proof is based on the specification architecture. The 
basic approach that we use is to try to match the static 
function structure of the extracted specification to the 
original specification, and to organize the proof as a 
series of lemmas about the specification architecture.
With this approach to proof, the closer the 
extracted specification’s architecture comes to that of 
the original specification, the higher the chance of the 
proof being completed successfully and in a reasonable 
time. The transformations that are selected to apply to 
the source program are those which will align the 
extracted specification’s architecture more closely with 
that of the original specification.
4.2.Support For The Implementation Proof
The implementation proof is the proof that the 
implementation implies the low-level specification. In 
the prototype Echo system, the implementation proof is 
carried out using the SPARK Ada toolset. The pre-
ferred approach to developing SPARK Ada software is 
to use correctness by construction [6]. In correctness 
by construction, the SPARK Ada tools are often able to 
complete proofs with either no or minimal human 
intervention. The proof process is repeated as the soft-
ware is constructed thereby ensuring that each refine-
ment leaves the software amenable to proof.
By contrast in Echo, since there are no restrictions 
on development techniques, the SPARK Ada tools fre-
quently fail when they are applied to software after 
development is complete. The low-level design of soft-
ware that is not developed using correctness by con-
struction is unlikely to be in a form suitable for proof. 
The reasons are many but, as with the implication 
proof, they typically fall under the heading of complex-
ity introduced to achieve some specific design or per-
formance goals.
The difficulties with the SPARK proof system take 
one of three forms: (1) the required annotations for 
function pre- and post-conditions can be many dozens 
of lines long, lengths that are impractically complex for 
humans to write; (2) the implementation proof 
exhausts available resources, usually memory, even 
though the SPARK tools are quite efficient and typi-
cally adequate for proofs that are needed for correct-
ness by construction; and (3) the verification 
conditions sometimes are sufficiently complex that 
they cannot be discharged automatically, and human 
guidance becomes necessary.
Verification refactoring addresses all three of these 
difficulties without limiting the development process. 
Because verification refactoring does not need to main-
tain any aspect of efficiency, any transformation that 
addresses the three types of difficulty can be used.
5. The Refactoring Process
5.1.Definition of Refactoring
The Echo verification argument relies upon refac-
toring, and so it is essential that there be a precise defi-
nition of refactoring and a mechanism for ensuring that 
refactoring complies with this definition in practice. 
Since Echo is verifying functional behavior, we make 
the following three simplifying assumptions: (1) the 
source program terminates; (2) refactoring does not 
preserve the execution time of the program; and (3) 
refactoring need not preserve the exact sequence of 
intermediate program states as long as the initial state 
and final state are unchanged. Assumption (3) also 
implies that floating-point arithmetic accuracy is not 
guaranteed to be preserved and that the semantics of 
non-thread-safe programs are not preserved. The trans-
formation from program P to program P’ is semantics 
preserving if, given the same initial state, both P and 
P’ will terminate and generate the same final state.
We need to be able to prove that any given trans-
formation is semantics preserving, and, in order to do 
so for the general case, we define the semantics of the elements we need to model the transformation in PVS.
For example, systems states are modeled as mappings 
between identifiers and values, statement blocks and 
subprograms are modeled as transitions between states, 
and pre- and post-conditions are predicates over states.
For each generalized transformation, we use the PVS 
theorem prover to discharge the following theorem:
init_state(P) = init_state(P’) 
=> final_state(P) = final_state(P’)
We have developed a preliminary library of trans-
formations for which the necessary properties have 
been proved. Similar libraries of semantics preserving 
transformations exist in the domains of compilation, 
software maintenance, and reverse engineering. We 
have included some common transformations in our 
library, but few existing transformations can be 
adapted because they have different goals. Compilation 
transformations, for example, are usually targeted at 
performance improvement. Ours are designed to 
reduce the complexity and size of verification condi-
tions, and so frequently reduce software’s efficiency.
Here we itemize some of the refactorings that we 
have developed and discuss how each affects the goal 
of verification. Due to space limitation, we do not 
include examples for each of them.
Rerolling loops. A sequence of repeated statement 
blocks that can be differentiated by a certain parameter 
can be converted into a loop based on that parameter. 
For example, if the parameter is an integer taking 
sequential values, we can turn the statements into a 
simple for-loop:
S1; S2; …; Sn;    Ü
for i in range 1..n loop S(i) end loop;
Rerolling unrolled loops allows generated verifi-
cation conditions to be simplified by recovering the 
loop structure and permitting the introduction of loop 
invariants, especially when the repeated statement 
block is large. 
Moving statements into or out of conditionals. Mov-
ing statement blocks into or out of conditional state-
ments provided no side effects will result can help to 
simplify execution paths and to reveal certain proper-
ties. An example would be the following if statement 
block. S1 has no effect on conditional B:
S1; if B then S2 else S3 end if;   Ü
if B then S1; S2 else S1; S3 end if;
Splitting procedures. Long procedures usually result 
in verbose and complex verification conditions. By 
splitting a procedure into a set of smaller sub-proce-
dures, the verification conditions become vastly sim-
pler and easier to manage.
Adjusting loop forms. Loops are frequently defined 
to promote efficiency and ease of use. Adjustment of 
the loop parameters can facilitate verification by, for 
example, allowing loop invariants to be inserted more 
easily thereby simplifying verification conditions.
Reversing inlined functions or cloned code. Revers-
ing inlined functions involves identifying cloned code 
fragments and replacing them with function definitions 
and calls. Function definitions can be provided by the 
user or be derived from the code. This transformation 
aligns the code structures with the specification and 
removes replicated or similar verification conditions so 
as to facilitate proof. Furthermore, by reversing the 
inlining of functions, if an error is identified in a partic-
ular inlined function, only that function needs to be re-
verified rather than all of the inlined instances.
Separating loops. Loops that combine operations can 
be split so as to simplify the associated loop invariants.
Modifying redundant or intermediate computations 
or storage. These transformations modify the program 
by adding or removing redundant or intermediate stor-
age or computation. This can facilitate proof by: (a) 
storing extra but useful information; (b) shortening the 
verification condition by removing redundant or inter-
mediate variables; or (c) merely tidying the code so as 
to facilitate understanding and annotation of the code.
All the above refactorings and associated proofs 
are for general programs. We discuss the use of these 
refactorings and the results of applying them in our 
case study in section 6.
5.2.Applying Refactoring
Our process for applying verification refactoring 
in practice is shown in Figure 1. A semantics-preserv-
ing transformation from the library is selected by the 
user (or suggested automatically), and the transformer 
then checks the applicability of the selected transfor-
mation mechanically and applies it mechanically if it is 
applicable. When all of the selected transformations 
have been applied, a metrics analyzer collects and ana-
lyzes the code properties of the transformed code, and 
presents the complexity metrics to the user. If the met-
ric results are not acceptable, or if they are acceptable 
but later verification proofs cannot be established, the 
process goes back to refactoring and more transforma-
tion are performed.
The role of the source-code metrics is to give the 
user insight into the likely success of the two Echo 
proofs. We hypothesize that the metrics we use are an 
indication of relative complexity and therefore of 
likely verification difficulty, and we present some sup-
port for this hypothesis in the case study.Verification refactoring cannot be fully automatic 
in the general case, because recognizing effective 
transformations requires human insight except in spe-
cial cases. Furthermore, some software, especially 
domain-specific applications, might require transfor-
mations that do not exist in the library. In such circum-
stance, the user can specify and prove a new semantics-
preserving transformation using the proof template we 
provide and add it to the library.
To facilitate exploration with transformations, if 
the user has confidence in a new transformation, the 
semantics-preserving proof can be postponed until the 
transformation has been shown to be useful or even 
until the remainder of the verification is complete.
In most cases, the order in which transformations 
are applied does not matter. Clearly, however, when 
two transformations are interdependent, they have to 
be applied in order. A general heuristic is that those 
transformations that change the program structure and 
those that can vastly reduce the code size should be 
applied earlier.
We are not aware of any circumstances of their 
application in which a transformation would have to be 
removed, and we make no explicit provision for 
removal in the current tools and process. In the event 
that it becomes necessary, removing a transformation is 
made possible by recording the software’s state prior to 
the application of each transformation.
All the user activities, especially the design and 
selection of transformations, have to be mechanically 
checked, and these two activities need to be supported 
by automation to the extent possible. The transformer 
is implemented using the Stratego/XT toolset [4]. 
Stratego checks the applicability of the selected trans-
formation, and carries it out mechanically using term 
rewriting. We use the PVS theorem prover as the trans-
formation proof checker and provide a proof template. 
When the user specifies a new transformation, an 
equivalence theorem will be generated automatically, 
and the user can discharge it interactively in the theo-
rem prover.
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Figure. 1. The verification refactoring process.
To our knowledge, there is no verification com-
plexity metric available that could guide the user in 
selection of transformations, and so we present a 
hybrid of metrics to the user for review using a com-
mercial metric tool [2], the SPARK Examiner, and our 
own analyzer. The metrics include:
Element metrics. Lines of code, number of declara-
tions, statements, and subprograms, average size of 
subprograms, logical SLOC, unit nesting level, and 
construct nesting level.
Complexity metrics. McCabe cyclomatic complexity, 
essential complexity, statement complexity, short-cir-
cuit complexity, and loop nesting level.
Verification condition metrics. The number and size 
of verification conditions, maximum length of verifica-
tion conditions, and the time that the SPARK tools take 
to analyze the verification conditions.
Specification structure metrics. A summary and 
comparison of the architectures of the original and the 
extracted specifications to suggest an initial impression 
of the likely difficulty of the implication proof.
Interpretation of the metrics is subjective, and we 
do not have specific values that would give confidence 
in the ability of the PVS theorem prover to complete 
the implication proof.
We developed the following heuristics to both 
select transformations and determine the order of 
application: (1) transformations that depend on each 
other are applied in order; (2) transformations that 
impact the major sources of difficulty, such as code 
and VC size, are applied first; (3) transformations that 
affect global structure are applied earlier and those that 
affect local structure are applied later; and (4) refactor-
ing proceeds until all proofs are possible.
In practice, if specification extraction or either of 
the proofs fails to complete, or if either proof is unrea-sonably difficult, the user returns to refactoring and 
applies additional transformations.
6. Evaluation of Refactoring
In order to obtain an initial assessment of the effi-
cacy and utility of verification refactoring, we under-
took the verification of a non-trivial program that we 
did not develop. The issues that affect the efficacy and 
utility of verification refactoring include: (1) the ease 
with which developers can select transformations; (2) 
the ease with which developers can add domain spe-
cific transformations and prove them to be semantics 
preserving; (3) whether selected transforms do facili-
tate the necessary proofs; and (4) whether refactoring 
impedes development in some way.
Issues 1, 2, and 3 are tied closely to our use of met-
rics, since we anticipate the values of metrics being the 
basis for developers’ decisions. We sought to deter-
mine: (1) the impact on metrics of individual types of 
refactoring and of series of refactorings; and (2) the 
values of the metrics for software that was amenable to 
proof and refactorings that were suggested by the val-
ues of metrics. Our experience with refactoring in the 
verification of the subject application is the focus of 
this section and provides information about the first 
three issues. In section 7, we address the fourth issue.
6.1.The Advanced Encryption Standard
The subject of study was the Advanced Encryption 
Standard, and we used artifacts from the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST). In previous 
work [17], we conducted a study of the general feasi-
bility of an earlier version of Echo in which we verified 
only part of AES. In the work described here, we veri-
fied the functional correctness of the complete AES 
implementation. The AES artifacts that we used were:
FIPS 197 specification. The Federal Information 
Processing Standards Publication 197 [8] specifies the 
AES algorithm, a symmetric, iterated block cipher. The 
specification is mostly in natural language with mathe-
matical statements and pseudo code for some algorith-
mic elements.
ANSI C implementation. Developed by Rijmen et 
al. [7], this optimized implementation is written in 
ANSI C. It is 1258 lines of code and contains several 
optimizations to enhance its performance.
These two artifacts were written independently of 
this project by others, and so there were no constraints 
on the development process imposed by the subsequent 
application of Echo.
6.2.AES Verification
We developed a formal version of the FIPS 197 
specification in PVS and translated the ANSI C imple-
mentation into SPARK Ada, the notations used in the 
current Echo instantiation. The PVS specification is 
811 lines long, excluding boilerplate constant defini-
tions. The SPARK Ada implementation (1365 lines 
without annotations) was created by translation of the 
C statements into corresponding Ada statements.
The verification of AES employed the complete 
Echo process: (1) a series of refactoring transforma-
tions were applied; (2) the final refactored version was 
documented using the SPARK Ada annotation lan-
guage; (3) the code was shown to be compliant with 
the annotations; (4) a high-level specification was 
extracted from the refactored, annotated code; and (5) 
the extracted specification was shown to imply the 
original specification.
6.2.1. Verification Refactoring. The AES implemen-
tation employs various optimizations (including imple-
menting functions using table lookups, fully or 
partially unrolling loops, and packing four 8-bit bytes 
into a 32-bit word) that improved performance but also 
created difficulties for verification. For instance, the 
SPARK tools ran out of resources on the original pro-
gram because the unrolled loops created verification 
conditions that were too large.
We applied 50 refactoring transformations in eight 
categories. Of those 50, the following 38 transforma-
tions from six categories were selected from the proto-
type Echo refactoring library (the number after the 
category name is the number of transformations 
applied in that category): rerolling loops (5); reversing 
inlined functions or cloned code (11); splitting proce-
dures (2); moving statements into or out of condition-
als (3); adjusting loop forms (4); modifying redundant 
or intermediate computations (2); and modifying 
redundant or intermediate storage (11). The rationale 
and use of these transformations are discussed in the 
next section. In addition to these transformations, we 
also added two new transformation categories for AES:
Adjusting data structures (2). 32-bit words were 
replaced by arrays of four bytes, and sets of four words 
were packed into states as defined by the specification. 
Constants and operators on those types were also rede-
fined accordingly to reflect the transformations.
Reversing table lookups (10). Ten table lookups were 
replaced with explicit computations based on the docu-
mentation and the precomputed tables removed.
Both of these two added transformation types were 
driven by the goal of reversing documented optimiza-tions and matching the extracted specification to the 
original specification. The final refactored AES pro-
gram contained 25 functions and was 506 lines long.
6.2.2. Complexity Metrics Analysis. Using the heu-
ristics mentioned earlier, we selected and ordered 
transformations to use with AES. Rather than examin-
ing the effects of each transformation separately, we 
grouped the transformations into the following 14 
blocks: (1) loop rerolling for major loops in the encryp-
tion and decryption functions; (2) reversal of word 
packing to use four-byte arrays; (3) reversal of table 
lookups; (4) packing four words into a state; (5) rever-
sal of the inlining of the major encryption and decryp-
tion functions; (6) reversal of the inlining of the key 
expansion functions; (7) moving statements into condi-
tionals to reveal three distinct execution paths followed 
by procedure splitting; (8) adjustment of loop forms; 
(9) reversal of additional inlined functions; (10) loop 
rerolling for sequential state updates; (11) procedure 
splitting; (12) adjustment of intermediate variables; 
(13) adjustment of loop forms; and (14) additional pro-
cedure splitting.
Blocks 7-11 were for the subprogram that set up 
the key schedule for encryption, and blocks 12-14 were 
for the subprogram that modified the key schedule for 
decryption. As well as the main transformations, each 
block of transformations involved smaller transforma-
tions that modified redundant or intermediate computa-
tions and storage.
As part of determining whether further refactoring 
was required, we periodically attempted the proofs and 
determined the source-code metrics. Some of the 
results of the effect of applying the transformations on 
the values of the metrics are shown in Figure 2. The 
histograms show the values of different metrics after 
the application of the 14 blocks of transformations 
where block 0 is the original code. 
Figure. 2. Metric analysis with AES verification refactorings
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As the transformations were applied, the primary 
element metric, code size, dropped from over 1365 to 
412. The average McCabe cyclomatic complexity also 
declined, dropping from 2.4 to 1.48. Statement com-
plexity, essential complexity, etc. also declined. There 
is no evidence that these complexity metrics are related 
to verification difficulty, but their reduction suggests 
that the refactored program might generate less ver-
bose VCs and be easier to analyse.
Since we would not undertake full annotation until 
refactoring was complete, we had no way to assess the 
feasibility of the proofs. To gain some insight, we set 
the postconditions for all subprograms to true for each 
version of the refactored code, generated verification 
conditions (VCs) using the SPARK examiner, and sim-
plified the generated VCs using the SPARK simplifier. 
We measured the number of VCs, the size of VCs, the 
maximum length of VCs, and the time that the SPARK 
tools took to analyze the code. These data did not nec-
essarily represent the actual proof effort needed for the 
implementation proof, but they were an indication.
The times required for analysis with the SPARK 
tools after the various refactorings are shown as Figure 
2(c). Some blocks are shown with no value because the 
VCs were too complicated to be handled by the 
SPARK tools. After the first loop rerolling at block 1, 
the tools completed the analysis but took 7 hours and 
23 minutes on a 2.0 GHz machine. At block 2 with 
word packing reversed, the analysis again became 
infeasible. Analysis by the SPARK tools became feasi-
ble again by block 8 after we had adjusted the loop 
forms. The required analysis reached 1 minute 42 sec-
onds for the final refactored program.In block 1, 51.16 MB VCs were generated and 
2.59 MB were left after simplification. For the final 
refactored code, 1.90 MB VCs were generated and 86 
KB were left after simplification (Figs 2(d) and 2(e)).
The simplified VCs were those that needed human 
intervention to prove. After block 1, the maximum VC 
length was over 10,000 lines. In the final refactored 
code, the maximum was 68 lines. When the implemen-
tation annotation was complete, the maximum length 
of VCs needing human intervention was 126 lines.
We extracted a skeleton specification from the 
code after applying each block of transformations. 
These specifications were skeletons because they were 
obtained before the code had been annotated. We com-
pared the structure of the skeleton extracted specifica-
tion with that of the original specification by visually 
inspection and evaluated a match-ratio metric. This is 
defined as the percentage of key structural elements—
data types, operators, functions and tables—in the orig-
inal specification that had direct counterparts in the 
extracted specification. We hypothesize that this mea-
sure is an indication of the likelihood of successfully 
establishing the implication proof.
The values of the match ratio are shown in Figure 
2(f). The ratio increased gradually from 25.9% to 
96.3% as the transformation blocks were applied. 
There is only a small increase in its value after the 
block 8 transformations were applied, and the implica-
tion proof could have been attempted at that point. 
However, since the time required for the SPARK anal-
ysis was still declining, we chose to continue refactor-
ing until all metrics stabilized.
6.2.3. Implementation Proof. After refactoring, the 
code was examined and annotated manually. The 
actual numbers of annotations are shown in Table 1
Table 1: Annotations in implementation proof
Type Lines
Preconditions 8
Postconditions 123
Loop Invariants & Assertions 54
Proof Functions, Proof Rules, & Other 32
:
The implementation proof was carried out using 
the SPARK Ada toolset. A total of 306 VCs were gen-
erated, of which 86.6% were discharged automatically 
in 145 seconds on a 2.0 GHz machine. 15 out of 25 
functions had all VCs discharged automatically. The 
remaining VCs required quite straightforward manual 
intervention, usually involving either the application of 
preconditions or induction on loop invariants. The 
interactive proof process for each remaining VC was 
finished within a few minutes by a single individual 
who has a good level of SPARK Ada experience.
Throughout the proof process, the length of the 
VCs remained completely manageable. No difficulties 
were encountered in reading or understanding them, or 
in manipulation of them with the SPARK tools.
6.2.4. Implication Proof. The extracted specification 
(in PVS) produced by the Echo specification extraction 
tool was 1685 lines long. It was much larger than the 
original specification because the implementation con-
tained tables for multiplication in the GF(28) field 
which were not present in the original specification.
When typechecking the extracted specification, 
the PVS theorem prover generated 147 Type Correct-
ness Conditions (TCCs), of which 79 were discharged 
automatically by the theorem prover in 23.5 seconds on 
a dual 1.0 GHz machine and the remaining 68 were all 
subsumed by the proved ones.
As a result of verification refactoring, the architec-
ture of the extracted specification was sufficiently sim-
ilar to the architecture of the original specification that 
we were able to identify the matching elements easily. 
To prove the extracted specification implied the origi-
nal one, we created an implication theorem using a 
general process that is part of Echo [17].
There were 32 major lemmas in the implication 
theorem. Type checking of the implication theorem 
resulted in 54 TCCs, 29 of which were discharged 
automatically in 4.2 seconds on a dual 1.0 GHz 
machine and 25 were subsumed by the proved ones.
In most cases, the PVS theorem prover could not 
prove the lemmas completely automatically. However, 
the human guidance required was short and straightfor-
ward, typically including expansion of function defini-
tions, introduction of predicates over types, or 
application of extensionality. In some cases, introduc-
ing other previously proved supporting lemmas and 
structuring the proof as cases were required. Each lem-
mas was established and proved interactively in a few 
minutes (thus the implication theorem discharged). 
7. Refactoring and Defect Detection
When using formal verification, defects in the sub-
ject programs are revealed by a failure to complete the 
proof. Proof failures always present the dilemma that 
either the program or the proof could be wrong. This 
dilemma is present with any method, including testing.
Verification refactoring might make the dilemma 
worse or introduce other forms of difficulty in identify-
ing defects. In order to investigate this issue, we seeded 
defects into the original AES implementation and then determined the effect of each defect on verification. We 
present the results of that experiment in this section.
7.1.The Seeding Process
The seeding process was done by randomly choos-
ing a line number and performing a change in the code. 
Each defect in the program was a change in either: (a) a 
numeric value; (b) an array index; (c) an operator (for 
computation or predicate); (d) a variable or table refer-
ence; or (e) a statement or function call.
These types of defect are not equivalent to those 
introduced by programmers. However, they do reflect 
common errors that might be introduced, and there is 
some evidence that simple seeded defects share impor-
tant properties with actual defects [9].
Code and therefore the defects are closely tied into 
the annotations that document the low-level specifica-
tion. The defective code could be annotated so as to 
either describe its desired behavior rather than its 
actual behavior, or vice versa. We used both scenarios 
in this experiment and evaluated them separately.
7.2.Defect Location
There are three stages in the proof process that 
could expose defects in the code:
Verification refactoring. A defect could change the 
code such that it did not match a particular transforma-
tion template and the transformation could not be 
applied. For example, a defect in only one iteration of 
an unrolled loop rather than in all interactions would 
make loop rerolling inapplicable.
Implementation proof. Any inconsistency between 
the code and the annotations would be detected by the 
SPARK Ada tools. An inconsistency could arise 
because of a defect in either or both.
Implication proof. Defects in the code but with con-
sistent annotations, or postcondition annotations that 
are not strong enough, would cause the implication the-
orems to be unprovable and so would be detected by 
the implication proof.
7.3.Experimental Results
We seeded 15 defects, three defects of each basic 
type, one at a time into the AES implementation, and 
then we ran the Echo verification process twice for 
each defect. In the first (setup 1), we assumed that the 
defects were caused by misunderstandings of the speci-
fication when implementing the code, and the annota-
tions corresponded to the functional behavior of the 
code. In the second (setup 2), we assumed that the 
defects were introduced by implementation errors, and 
the annotations corresponded to the high-level specifi-
cation. The results are shown in tables 2 and 3.
Table 2: Defect detection for setup 1
Verification Stage Defects 
Caught
Defects 
Left
Initial state 15
Verification refactoring 4 11
Implementation proof in SPARK 2 9
Implication proof in PVS 8 1
For setup 1, most defects were caught during the 
implication proof since the annotation matched the 
code. The two defects that were caught in the imple-
mentation proof were found during the proof of excep-
tion freedom because they caused possible out-of-
bound array references. The remaining defect that was 
not caught at any stage was benign. We discuss it later.
Table 3: Defect detection for setup 2
Verification Stage Defects 
Caught
Defects 
Left
Initial state 15
Verification refactoring 4 11
Implementation proof in SPARK 10 1
Implication proof in PVS 0 1
For setup 2, most defects were caught during the 
implementation proof since the annotation did not 
match defective code. The remaining defect was the 
same benign defect.
In both setups, verification caught the same 14 
seeded defects. The remaining (benign) defect changed 
an array of keys. The length of the array had been set to 
accommodate the maximum number of rounds in the 
case of a 256-bit key length. However for key lengths 
of 128 bits or 192 bits, the last several entries in the 
array were not used in the computation. This was 
purely an implementation decision, and the specifica-
tion did not impose any restrictions. Thus, for shorter 
key lengths these entries could be allowed to have arbi-
trary values without affecting functional correctness.
Echo does require that the developer annotate the 
code, and, whenever there is an unprovable proof obli-
gation, the user has to determine whether it is the result 
of a defect in the code or the annotations. However, the 
use of architectural and direct mapping in the creation 
of the extracted specification means that the location of 
defects can be restricted to the function that cannot be 
proved. In the AES case, each function is quite small 
and manageable after verification refactoring, making 
defect location quite simple.8. Related Work
Retrieval of abstract specifications from source 
code through formal transformations has been reported 
in the reverse-engineering domain [5, 16]. The goal is 
to improve the structure of poorly-engineered code and 
to facilitate further analyses.
Paul et al. [13] are developing an approach to the 
determination of how refactorings affect the verifiabil-
ity of a program. Their focus is object-oriented design, 
and the goal is to see whether a syntactic change can 
make more properties amenable to analysis.
Smith et al. [15] have developed an infrastructure 
for verifying properties of block ciphers, including 
AES, and they have verified AES implementations in 
Java byte code. They noted different representations 
between the specification and the implementation, and 
provided transformation functions between the two. 
Kuehlmann1 et al. [10] have developed an 
approach called transformation-based verification for 
sequential verification of circuit-based designs. The 
approach uses structural transformation that relocates 
registers in a circuit-based design representation with-
out changing its actual input-output behavior, to 
increase the capacity of symbolic state traversal. Verifi-
cation refactoring adopts similar idea to transform the 
target being verified, but for software.
9. Conclusion
Refactoring deals with many of the issues that 
limit the applicability of formal verification including 
unworkably large verification conditions and the rigid 
development process necessary for refinement.
We have demonstrated the efficacy and utility of 
refactoring by verifying a moderate-sized program 
written by others and not designed for verification. The 
refactoring process was guided by a set of complexity 
metrics that helped both select transformations and 
determine when the program was likely to be amenable 
to proof. Off-the-shelf verification was impossible 
using conventional tools, but the addition of refactor-
ing made the task both feasible and straightforward. In 
an experiment using seeded defects, we have also dem-
onstrated that locating defects in software for which 
verification is being attempted is fairly straightforward, 
even when verification refactoring is being applied.
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